Do you have anything concerning your Ship, the 2nd Deployment? If so, do not let it becoming lost,
contact either the Secretary or the Webmaster so it can be published here.
The Marek’s unofficial Vietnam Service Dossier:
Dear Reader,
From this point forward in the pictorial time line my major source of information regarding the Gunline
ships are the ROPs; the monthly (Report of Proceedings) from the Captain of each deployment to
the Office of the Flag Officer Commanding, H.M. Australian Fleet. These records are held by the
Australian War Memorial, this deployment is (AWM (141/7) pts 1-3) and the access status is
listed as open….. The words here are those of Captain Shands. Not mine, as you must interpret the
facts yourself.
HMAS Hobart 2nd Deployment - Captain K.W.Shands RAN
The destroyer USS EDSON (DD 946) was detached from the NGFS task unit and sent north to join Hobart and Chandler on the 15th in surveillance of Tiger Island, a rocky isle thirteen miles east of Cap Lay which was the site of enemy radar monitoring Sea Dragon and NGFS ships. With only one somewhat over-extended Sea Dragon task unit in operation, it was found that WBLCs were re-supplying the island’s garrison at night, and an increase in Sea Dragon ships was authorized to provide more patrols in the Cap Lay area.
Whilst proceeding north for the planned 2330 mission, a signal from CTU 77.1.0 (Captain I.L. Smith. USN) in BOSTON was received at 1720 ordering the Task Unit to cancel the mission and conduct surveillance from 17Deg 22’(N) , south to CAP LAY and to be alert for hostile Helos. Course was reversed and speed increased to 26 knots. The previous night USS BOSTON had reported firing on enemy helicopters in the DMZ area which had fired at the ship and also those two SWIFT boats that had been fired on by Helos closer inshore, whilst searching for the survivors of another SWIFT boat that had been sunk off the DMZ Later that same nigh enemy helo activity had allegedly occurred between the coast and Tiger Island; one naval aircraft from the USS ENTERPRISE which had been called in by BOSTON reported shooting down an enemy Helo. Some confusion had occurred as to whether lighted helos in the area were friendly or otherwise, as no IFF response was received, some were stated to have flown to the USN Hospital ship anchored further south. Additionally rocket fire to seaward from the DMZ area has been reported. A possible repetition of these events has prompted CTU 77.1.0 to position my Task Unit on patrol to the north of CAP LAY.
The task Unit arrived on station at 2100 and I assigned the three ships circular operating areas, radius 5 miles covering the area between the coast and TIGER ISLAND and Latitude 17Deg 22’N . At the same time I requested information regarding any friendly air-craft participating and whether guns were free in the areas. I was aware of the USS EPPERSON being to the Northward of HOBART, but otherwise there were no other ships known to be North of the DMZ. Pending receipt of these details I instructed the TU to conduct surveillance for WBLC and slow moving aircraft within our assigned area.
R.J.Butterworth
(Photo by Peter Manoel)
At 0203 the reply to my request arrived in the ship. This confirmed that there was no relaxation or alteration to the Standing Rules of Engagement and established an Air defence Space 35 miles wide from 17Deg 10’ (N) south to 16Deg 45’ (N). It also stated that CTU 77.1.0 had no knowledge of scheduled friendly aircraft in my area, however to be alert for Airforce strikes and C.A.P. activity.
This answer in fact did not alter the conditions under which the TU normally operates under which the TU normally operated when in NVN water, I interpreted the Air Defence Space as that is in which the C.A.P., under BOSTON’s control, would operate. At approximately 0309 a single aircraft was detected on SPS-52 radar, tracking east from the vicinity of CAP LAY towards TIGER ISLAND The aircraft did not appear to be showing IFF and was therefore given close scrutiny. This was not unique as during the middle watch several aircraft had been detected, not showing IFF initially, which did subsequently. Also on occasions the C.A.P. aircraft were lost as they overflew CAP LAY and it took some time to establish their identity as they recrossed the coast.
At this time there was a continuo use residual ring of IFF responses from units at a radius of 14-15 miles from the ship. The contact turned to the east of TIGER ISLAND and was indicated AA (Anti aircraft) control as it was tracked approaching the ship. AA control alerted lookouts and endevoured to visually identify the contact using the night observation device. At 0313 course 305, speed 12 knots the ship was struck on the starboard side ad midships by an air launched missile. The missile impact point is estimated to have been just aft of the forward personnel boat davit; the expanding rod warhead penetrated 01 deck into the CPO Mess Pantry and the adjacent passage way. Penetrated the screen into the SPS-52 radar room, and the Missile Director Control Room and severely damaged the Secondary Conning Position.
This flying metal killed Ordinary Seaman R.J. Butterworth, R66558 and wounded ABQMG J.R. Parker, R63307 and ORDWM R.F. Davidson, R66565. The explosion was the first indication that the ship was under attack. Full ahead and maximum wheel was ordered, Action Stations sounded and the Task Unit informed.
Meanwhile the aircraft, estimated now to be at 450 knots was tracked to the North West until it merged with the coast. An aircraft presumed to be the same one re-appeared on radar shortly afterwards, still at high speed heading for the ship. Starboard wheel was ordered and the ship was on a heading 040, 27 knots when attacked the second time. The damage caused by the first hit had rendered SPS-52, the Missile system and one UHF aerial unserviceable. As fate would have it, SPG-53B Auto Tracking capabilities had been reported suspect soon after 0300 when the system would not hold track on several small surface contacts (fishing boats). At 0307 this system was placed on 15 minutes standby to enable the fault to be rectified and despite all efforts, I was not able to use this system to engage the aircraft. All units in the area and the Carrier Groups in the TONKIN GULF were informed that the ship was under attack. The ship was closing up, but had not assumed full action stations at the time of the second attack which proved fortuitous as more casualties would have been sustained particularly in the after end of the ship. Again the aircraft was not sighted visually on its approach.
At 0316 more missiles were fired at the ship from very fine on the starboard quarter from close range with the aircraft very low over the water.
Two missiles struck the ship almost simultaneously, one penetrated the transom just below the upper deck on the starboard side, passing through the Gunner’s Store, demolishing that area continued through the passageway on 2 deck level, penetrating the athwart ships bulkhead to the Engineers Workshop and it is believed broke up there without the warhead activating. A large piece penetrated the bulkhead into the After Seaman’s Mess and 2 Deck was penetrated in several places. The second missile exploded just aft of the after Personnel Boat davit in the same general area as the missile in the first attack. The expanding rod went through the Fan Space, Missile Director Equipment Room, Director No2 and Tartar Check Room. Some of the warhead also penetrated the deck into the forward end of the CPO Mess causing much overhead damage, killing CEWR RH Hunt, R54257 and causing injuries to several sailors closing up at their action stations. The remainder of the body of the missile penetrated the Fan Space at the base of the after funnel and struck the deck head of the IKARA Magazine.
The aircraft crossed over the ship and made a tight turn climbing to starboard and was seen for the first time, being described by two reliable observers as a swept wing jet fighter. The aircraft continued on its turn to starboard and appeared to be turning for a third attack. At an approximate range of 8000 yards, Mount 51, in local control, fired 5 rounds of VT and the aircraft turned away to the east and south, fading on the SPS-10 radar just south of TIGER Island. The Rules of Engagement cannot be discussed in this document but it should be stated that HOBART would not have been complying with those rules had she engaged the aircraft before the first attack. In the Operations Room the second hit resulted in a fault in gyro supply to SPS-10 causing the radar picture on all displays to rotate in a haphazard manner. Compilation of even a simple functional relative picture was impossible and the ship was therefore unable to effectively utilise the C.A.P. aircraft made available by USS BOSTON, to intercept the attacking aircraft. In addition, this made 5” Gun target designation virtually impracticable.
Compilers note: John Trevor Polley R62303 wrote LSRP with ASAC & AIC tickets (anti sub air controller - Air intercept controller)
I served with the first 5 captains on the Hobart, Griffiths, Shands, Swan, Robinson, and Nicholson.
Ken Shands and Ian Nicholson passed away last year. When she (Hobart) was hit she lost all electrical power to the Radar, guns and missile system as well as most of her radio antenna. Systems power was go at all times, at the time of the incident I was on watch in the CIC (Ops room) we were travelling south with two in company at just over 20 knots. Tiger Is. was bearing about 200' at a range of just over 20 miles. Both mounts were out of action as Mt 51 had been scoring the reject shell cases and there was a danger of an in barrel explosion. One of the reasons that there was no bird on the rail at the time of the attack was that under the rules of engagement we could not "lock on" or even have a live missile on the rails until the "Boggie" proved it hostile After the first hit the only radar we had was the SPS10 surface radar that aerial was just swanning around with the ships movement. It was pure coincidence that the F4 was at low level and just happened to be in the sweep area so that we could recognize part of the coastline that enabled us to know that it was coming in for the second run and we could let the bridge / Mt 51 know that it was coming back for a third run. 52 fired 5 HE rounds as it turned for the third run and the pilot saw the flashes.
The ships continued in a northeast direction while quick stock of damage was taken. Efforts had been made to bring up the SPS-40 radar from standby but the set did not provide an effective picture. At this time it was confirmed that the ship had only SPS-10 radar and the 5” mounts in local control air/surface sensors and weapons. It will be recalled that the 5” gun barrel/powder made firing hazardous and that the guns therefore could only be used in an emergency. t was obviously necessary to retire from the general area to improve chances of a warning should another attack develop. At about 0330 USS EDSON reported being fired on by rockets from an aircraft, I ordered the Task Unit to assume an AA formation, reversing course to the west briefly to expedite USS CHANDLER joining.
By 0414 this was achieved with EDSON south and CHANDLER to the west, both at 2500 yards on an easterly course at 25 knots. At this time orders were received to join USS BOSTON and CTU 70.8.9 embarked in USS BLANDY (DD943)
At 0515 the Task Unit joined BOSTON and together with BLANDY formed a circular AAW screen around the cruiser on a course of north at 15 knots towards Yankee Station Forces. Initially in HOBART, repair and isolation of damage continued and care was given to the wounded. As it became light, the extensive damage to the superstructure became apparent.
At 0619 the damage situation was sufficiently under control for the ship to revert to Condition 3.
At 0705 a Helo from USS ENTERPRISE, which I had requested shortly after the attack, arrived to MEDIVAC the two sailors killed in action, and ABQMG Parker, ME J Holmes and ABFC Laity, who were considered to require further treatment in the hospital at DA NANG. The Ship’s Company commenced cleaning up the debris both above and below decks. All parts of the missiles which could be located were collected together for subsequent identification; at this time items bearing the names of US manufacturers were discovered.
At 0740 COMDESQUAD 2, embarked in BLANDY instructed me to take charge of the Task Unit and to resume normal operations. As this was clearly impossible, I instructed EDSON to take charge of CHANDLER and proceed to an UNREP, which had been scheduled for the TU at 0730. I then informed CTU 77.1.0 in BOSTON and COMDESQUAD 2 of the state of the ship and that I considered the ship should proceed to Subic Bay for repairs. In due course, CTU 77.1.0 approved this proposal and directed EDSON to assume duties of CTU 77.1.2.
HOBART detached from BOSTON and BLANDY at 1016 and shortly afterwards rendezvoused with EDSON and CHANDLER which were replenishing from USS NAVASOTA (AO-106) and USS VIRGO (AE-30). materials, together with as full a brief as possible in the short time available. The transfer was completed at 1118 and on detaching, HOBART set course for Subic Bay at 17 knots.
At 1400 the ship was stopped for 2 hours while temporary repairs were affected on the hole in the stern. Throughout the passage the Ship’s Company continued trying to restore the ship and to collect pieces of missile. I had ordered a thorough investigation of the incident and as more and more Officers and Sailors were interviewed, and the sequence of events reconstructed, it became very clear that there had been many cases of calm and courageous actions, and a minimum of disorder. I was very proud of my ship’s company.’
At 1600 on Tuesday the 18th June, HMS INTREPID (Captain J.A.R. Troup, DSC RN), flying the flag of Flag Officer, Second in command Far East Fleet, Rear Admiral E.B. Ashmore CB, DSC, RN with HMS CARPRICE (Commander T.M. Beven, RN) in company, closed from the North. The two ships were manoeuvred across HOBART’s bow and down the Starboard side at a close distance from which the ships damage was clearly visible, FO2FEF signalled his sympathy for those killed and wounded before the two ships turned southward en route to SINGAPORE.
At 1935the ship rendezvoused with the USS HENRY B WILSON (DDG -7) and the USS COCHRANE (DDG-21). Arrangements had been made for Hobart to transfer a Missile Director Amplidyne drive motor and coupling to WILSON and, at 1945 a highline transfer commenced at Station 1 and 2, as this was the only replenishment station I considered safe to use. Wilson kindly provided a large amount of electrical cable which would undoubtedly be invaluable during the restoration of the ship especially as a fire in SUBIC BAY had damaged the store containing cable. The transfer completed at 2045. During the passage and the days that followed I was moved by the number of signals received from both RAN and USN ships and authorities expressing sympathy for the wounded and for their families and the families of the sailors killed. Such signals were sent by numerous USN ships with whom the ship had come in contact only briefly and it confirmed my belief that HOBART is considered very much a part of the US 7th Fleet.
SUBIC Bay was entered at 0730 on Wednesday the 19th, and Hobart secured alongside Rivera Point in the Naval Base at 0815.
At 0830 Rear Admiral MOORE boarded and walked around to inspect the ship. Rear Admiral MOORE had been directed by COMSEVENTHFLT to inquire into the incidents off CAP LAY on the nights of the 15/16th and 16/17th June and had flown from his flagship the USS ST PAUL in JAPAN the previous evening.
A large amount of documentary evidence and some photographs were given to the Admiral’s Staff, and my officers and I discussed the attack on HOBART. He was offered the missile pieces which had been picked up onboard and, these he passed onto the Naval Magazine SUBIC foe analysis.
Rear Admiral MOORE addressed the Ships Company and expressed his regrets at the incident before he departed for VIETNAM at 1150 to continue his investigation. Representatives of the Ships Repair Facility also boarded during the forenoon and examined the damage in detail. At 1400 I was represented by my Weapons Electrical Officer, Commander F.O. ELIASON and the Engineering Officer Lieutenant Commander D.G. HOLTHOUSE at a meeting with the SRF Planning Officers and Section Heads. The SRF presented two interim estimates for the repair of the ship; a ‘patch’ of 12 days and a ‘Mint’ of 6 weeks. The former would have restored the watertight integrity of the ship and one Missile System and the latter as the name implies a complete restoration.
The advantages of the shorter estimate, particularly the moral benefits of returning to the Line in the shortest possible time seemed at the time to be the better solution. Meanwhile Dockyard workmen commenced cutting away damaged areas preparatory to renewal work.
At 1545 hours CINPACFLT, Admiral J.J. HYLAND, USN. Accompanied by COMNAVBASE SUBIC, Rear Admiral F.B. GILKESON, USN arrived onboard from MANILA to inspect the damage. At this stage the Ships Company have been informed that the missiles had been of US origin; probably SPARROW 3.
Admiral HYLAND in his address to the Ship’s Company informed them that it had now begun to emerge that the missile had been fired by a US aircraft and he was genuinely moved when expressing his sorrow for the incident. The Admiral also stated that the US would ensure the ship would be made as new.
At 1630 the ship was turned by tugs and re-berthed starboard side to the wharf to facilitate repairs.
At 0800 on Thursday 20th, colours were half masted in all ships in honour of CPO HUNT and ORD BUTTERWORTH. At 0930 lower deck was cleared and a Memorial Service, conducted by Chaplain Mc MAHON and Chaplain RILEY was held on Mount 52 Deck.
With more data at my disposal I called a meeting of my officers to discuss the merits of the two repair estimates as the SRF required an immediate indication of what would be required. The merits of having the short and incomplete repair affected, the remainder to be followed at some later stage by the requirement for a further 6 weeks in dockyard hands was still attractive from the moral point of view. However from every other aspect it was abundantly clear that the ship should be fully operational at the earliest date and, therefore the ‘Mint Job’ was required now.
At 1115 accompanied by my Technical Departmental Heads I attended a meeting with Captain D.H. Jackson USN, the Commanding Officer of the SRF, and his staff. Captain Jackson was clearly relieved to hear my decision and in anticipation of your concurrence, I authorized this work to commence.
Work on the ship continued at an extraordinary rate. Two shifts each of 12 hours worked continuously with an enthusiasm the like of which I have never seen in a dockyard. The ship shut down the steam plants and reverted to shore power.
At 1000 on Friday 21st accompanied by two of my Officers I visited the Naval Magazine, SUBIC. All parts of the missile located onboard had been transferred to the NAVMAG earlier in the week and after careful scrutiny the experts there were able to identify them as portions of at least two SPARROW 3 Missiles which had been supplied to the 7th Air Force at UBON in THAILAND in May.
At 1645 the same day welcomed onboard the Commander in Chief, PACIFIC, Admiral Ulysses Grant Sharp, USN accompanied by The Commander, US 7th Fleet, Vice Admiral W.F. Bringle USN. Commander Task Force 77, Rear Admiral R.W. Cousin, USN; and COMNAVBASE SUBIC Rear Admiral F.B. Gilkeson, USN.
Admiral Sharp was in the area in conjunction with a civil function in MANILA and I was very pleased that he could find time to visit HOBART to view the damage. The admiral indicated that he had directed that the inquiry into the CAP LAY incidents being conducted by Rear Admiral Moore was to be upgraded to a Joint Service levels which he said would provide a more meaningful conclusion. The party left the ship at 1725.
At 0030, Saturday the 22nd, Captain M.P. Reed, RAN your Chief Staff Officer (Technical), accompanied by Lieutenant Commander I.F. Holmes, RAN, and Mr. J. Lee arrived onboard having travelled by air to MANILA thence by car from MANILA that evening . During the next four days the Officers studied the damage to the ship and conferred with Ship’s Officers and authorities ashore. Captain Reed flew onto DA NANG to become associated with the inquiry on the morning of the 25th, at which time LCDR Holmes and Mr. Lee returned to MANILA for passage to AUSTRALIA. Sunday the 23rd June 1968 At 0800 on Saturday 23rd, by kind arrangement of VADM Bringle, a P3 Orion aircraft was made available to fly me, accompanied by the medical Officer, Surgeon Lieutenant G.R. Erwin, RAN and three sailors to VIETNAM; the sailors were particular friends of the three of HOBART’s crew hospitalized there. On arrival in DA NANG we proceeded to the Military Hospital and I was pleased that Able Seaman Laity was sufficiently recovered to join us. The P3 was used again to fly onto SAIGON, where a C1A was provided for the short hop to VUNG TAU.
At the Australian Military Hospital, Able Seaman Parker and ME Holmes were visited and provided with mail, their pay, and news of the ship. Accommodations had been arranged at VUNG TAU and Monday the 24th June 1968.
The following morning the party flew back to SAIGON where I called on the Commander, Australian Forces Vietnam; Major General S.M. Macdonald at the CHOLOON Head Quarters. After a thoroughly interesting and worthwhile visit. I returned to SUBIC arriving at 1400 on Monday 24th. Thursday 27th June 1968. On Thursday the 27th the ship was listed 5 degrees to port and the suspect Mark 18 Mod 3 barrels replaced with Mod 1 barrels by the staff of USS PIEDMONT.
On Saturday the 29th I exchanged calls with the Captain of USS FALGOUT (DER-324) Lieutenant Commander J. Hamrick, USN who kindly offered to take mail to BRISBANE the following Monday.
At 1130 hours. Major General R.F. WORLEY, USAF, the Vice Commander United States 7th Air Force called onboard. The General delivered a personal note from the Commander of the 7th Air Force General William Momyer expressing sympathy and alluding to an ‘operational error’ on the 17th. General Worley viewed the areas of the ship where damage had occurred although by this time much of the damage had been replaced or was in the process of repair. After lunching in the Wardroom, General Worley departed at 1340. Killed in action were two members of Hobart’s crew R66558 Butterworth, R.J. Ordinary Seaman Quartermaster Gunner, 18 years old, single of Risdon Vale, Hobart, TASMANIA, and R54257 Hunt, R.H. Chief Electrical Weapons Radar, 27 years old, of GERALDTON, Western Australia.
Wounded were:
R66565 Davidson, R.F. Ord Seaman weapons mechanic
R93110 Holmes, J. Engineering mechanic
R64209 Laity, K.R. Able Seaman fire control
R57684 Mieszkuc, W. Leading Seaman Clearance diver
R63307 Parker, J.R. Able Seaman QM gunner
R41784 Raymond, D.T.J. Petty Officer engineering mech
R65336 Scully, G.H. Engineering mechanic
Compilers note.
End of extract Hobart Friendly fire.
The concept of the ‘Vietnam Service Dossier’ is copyright. I have compiled the facts from the public domain, released
files from the Australian War Memorial, and highlighted the text with original comments and photos from shipmates. Where ever possible all submitted material is suitably credited and acknowledged.
The following Reports of Proceedings were researched and submitted by David Peterson. Thank you David for your time to research these for us.
(Webmaster: You may have to enlarge your image to be able to read the text. Unfortunately due to the size of the images of each page of the Report, it may take a few minutes to download this complete page).
Canberra, 28 SEPTEMBER 2010
HMAS HOBART VIETNAM DEPLOYMENT ROP EXTRACTS
The enclosed Report of Proceedings for HMAS HOBART are copies of the set held in the Australian War Memorial archives.
The Extracts include the main ROP report as signed by the Commanding Officer and include a cross section but not all of the numerous annexes which support the report of proceeding (officers' movements, Summary of NGS mission etc). This has been done to reduce the bulk of these ROPS and to meet the needs of most people who would wish mainly to access the narrative of the deployments. Should sufficient interest be shown we can add the additional annexes.
The ROPS selected are those which cover the departure from Sydney, the Vietnam deployment and the return to Sydney. All narratives are complete except one where the signature page seems to be missing from the file.
Those who would like to access the records to obtain further detail can follow the steps in the following web link in making a request to the Research Centre of the AWM. With 24 hours notice, the records can be retrieved and made available in the Reading Room:
http://awm.altarama.com/reft100.aspx?mi=Cm8Wr0hOMk6z8V2mLqurGg.
The Annex to this note shows the response from the AWM to my request to obtain access to the ROPs.
The staff in the Research Centre approved most helpful. The natural lighting in the research centre is quite adequate and halogen reading lights are also available for illumination.
Also of interest is the AWM Collection of Photographs which includes a number of photographs of HMAS HOBART and personnel during the Vietnam deployments (as well as the cruiser HMAS HOBART). They can be viewed by accessing the following web link:
http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/photographs
and insert HMAS HOBART in the search box.
David Peterson
Report of Proceedings
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