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SECRET: BERBERA - HMAS HOBART - 7th September, 1940 "HOBART'S" Report of the Evacuation of British Somaliland.



Sir, I have the honour to submit the following report of the operation dealing with the evacuation of British Somaliland through Berbera, of troops, civilian personnel and military equipment and stores and their embarkation in HM Ships and transports.

2. All times given in this report are local.

3. In order to assist to a clear understanding of the evacuation of British Somaliland, a colony that has been under the protection of Britain since 1884, it is well to trace briefly the recent history of events dealing with the military re-enforcement of British Somaliland, the short sojourn of the re-enforcement in that that country and the course of events that left no alternative but rapid evacuation.

4. The event is an historic one for, as far as I have been able to trace, it marks the first occasion in British history that British territory has been yielded by force to an invading enemy. The case of 1776 when the colony of North America gained its independence from England is not a parallel case to this one.

5. Until May 1940, the military forces established in British Somaliland consisted of the Somaliland Camel Corps, a force of six hundred and fifty strong of Somali troops commanded by a British officer holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

6. On 15th May this force was reinforced by a battalion of 2nd King's African Rifles that arrived in HM Transport "KARANJA" together with motor vehicles and stores.

7. HMA Ship under my command was present at Berbera to organise and assist in the discharge of all these re-enforcement and to give the necessary protection against any possible attack by the enemy. Our anti-aircraft guns were frequently in action in repelling the enemy's bombing and fighter attacks, during the periods that the transports were unloading.

8. A night attack by enemy surface forces, either destroyers or MTBs was an ever-present possibility, which in an unprotected harbour as Berbera is, required that the armament be manned and a most vigilant watch be maintained both by day and by night.

9. Opportunity was taken during the weeks preceding the evacuation to make an examination of the coast West of Berbera with a view to supporting our army's right flank, should the necessity arise.

10. On 11th June, 1940 Italy entered the War against the British empire and France, but within a few weeks France ceased to support England in her fight against Germany and Italy by an Armistice signed on 22nd June, 1940, and French Somaliland under the military control of General Le Gentilhomme tried for some weeks to fight on by the side of the Allies against Italy, but was finally forced to abandon the struggle on 3rd August when he made a dash by car from Djibouti sleeping by the side of the road at night to arrive in Berbera on 4th August, a man broken by disappointment and physical fatigue. He stayed in Government House in Berbera a patient in bed two days, and was then flown by RAF plane to Aden and admitted into hospital.

11. The course that the War in Africa had thus taken compelled the important decision to be made of whether to heavily reinforce or evacuate.

12. I understand that the decision was made to hold British Somaliland by the provision of strong re-enforcement. Re-enforcement of personnel and great quantities of stores of every description commenced to arrive. A colonel on the Active List was transferred from Palestine and appointed as Base Commandant, Berbera, with instructions to organise the Base for two divisions. A Major General was appointed to Command the Forces in Somaliland and arrived by plane at La Ferug on 10th August - just before the first Italian attack on our positions.

13. But although transports of soldiers and stores were arriving no guns other than four three-inch HA guns for the defence of Berbera had so far arrived. Thus, the British Army in Somaliland, having as its most potent weapon a Light Battery of four 3.7 inch Howitzers, was in possession of but few guns competent to deal with the modern mechanised weapons possessed by the enemy.

14. On the evening of 9th August an officer from military Headquarters was sent to me to ask if assistance could be given by providing a gun suitable as an anti-tank weapon. A three-ponder Hotchkiss Saluting gun was expeditiously fitted with an improvised but ingenious mounting made from a forty-gallon oil drum re-enforced by iron plating welded on. This gun, complete with crew and all available ammunition, totalling sixty-four rounds, was rushed up to the front line that night and was mounted in position by 0400 the following morning. The type of ammunition available was thirty-two steel shell and thirty-two rounds of HE. It was considered the steel shell would have proved a suitable counter for the enemy tanks, but the efficiency of the HE is doubted.

15. At this stage of the operations, therefore, when enemy was momentarily expected to deliver his attack the only prospect of staying his advance in the important Observation Hill section of Tug Argon Gap, was I understand, centred in our one limited to a supply of thirty-two rounds.

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16. Under such circumstances the possibility that an evacuation might be forced on us had not escaped unnoticed, and many of the forms it might take I had carefully turned over in my mind. I had also endeavoured, with all due discretion, to bring to the mind of certain authoritative persons ashore at Berbera the possibility of such an event.

17. On 8th August I held a conference on board my ship for the purpose of coordinating the ship and shore A/A defences for the defence of Berbera and for improving the system of A/A layouts. The conference was attended by representatives of the Somaliland Government, of the Army, Air Force, Police, Air Raid Precautions, the Secretary to the Governor and the Garrison Engineers. Before the meeting closed I suggested that, because of the uncertainty of War, the possibility of evacuation should be carefully considered, and that without putting anything on paper those holding authoritative positions in Berbera should have some plan worked out in their minds.

18.  I had also, on 1st August, discussed the matter at length with His Excellency the Governor and Brigadier G. Chater then commanding the military forces in Somaliland. On 8th August I had, in accordance with instructions from the Senior Naval Officer of Red Sea Force, an interview with Brigadier Chater to discuss the evacuation scheme, and report. The interview took place at Fort Headquarters behind the line at La Ferug. The enemy's attack was expected next day.

19.  The harbour of Berbera (Chart no. 3530) is, as a port, practically undeveloped. It's trading in peacetime is limited to Dhows and a small 660 ton steamer which calls once a week. Port facilities hardly exist. There are two piers, one of stone called the Customs Pier, and one of wood, the Shaab Pier, capable of taking lighters of ship's boats between half and full tide. There is insufficient water for tugs to get alongside at any time. At low tide the Shaab Pier dries completely. The  Customs Jetty is too high out of the water for use in ???? or motor vehicles on to lighters. There are no lifting appliances of any kind on either pier.

20.  Such limited facilities make the port of Berbera a difficult one from which to handle heavy military stores, but there is yet another most hampering and retarding factor - the Kharif. During the months of June, July, August, and September, a strong SW wind known as the Kharif commences each night and blows for approximately twelve hours. It frequently reaches gale force, and has, in fact, twice, during the period when troops were being landed at Berbera in the weeks preceding the evacuation, caused "HOBART" to drag with both anchors. Normally all ship's boats are hoisted and boat communication with the shore ceases during the hours the Kharif is blowing.

21.  From the foregoing it will be seen that under favourable conditions the transferring of stores and lighters or troops in boats could only be undertaken for a limited period of the twenty-four hours, depending on the state of the tide in time relation to the blowing of the Kharif. The tides in Berbera harbour appear to be most irregular and do not conform to anything approaching a six-hour period.

22.  There is a steep-to sandy spit one hundred and fifty yards to the East of Shaab Pier, to which ship's boats could approach at any state of the tide. Some weeks before, when reinforcements were still arriving the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea had directed that this spit should be developed as an additional landing place and to this end an old wooden lighter was purchased.

23.  The work of decking in this lighter, building a ramp and fitting it generally as a pontoon pier was the responsibility of the Garrison Engineers. Although I had made many requests that this important work might be put in hand and its completion hastened, nothing had been done by the 8th August. I therefore undertook to do the work with "HOBART'S" ship's staff and the work was commenced at once.

24. In this connection I would like to draw attention to the very fine work performed by Mr. E.V. Gooch, Commissioned Shipwright RAN and his staff of Shipwrights and joiners who completed the work at great speed, in great heat and frequently subjected to enemy air attack, with no air raid shelters provided. The pontoon was completed and ready for use about an hour before the evacuation commenced.

25. Wednesday 14th August: "HOBART" arrived Berbera at 1726.

26. Thursday 15th August: The Italians were advancing against our front line positions in overwhelming strength, supported by artillery, tanks and aircraft. It appeared imminent that a general retreat would be ordered, and that the military plan for the Evacuation of Somaliland, which had arrived onboard during the forenoon, might be put into operation. The plan initiated by the GOC Somali Force, Major General A.H. Godwin Austin who was still at advance Head Quarters provided for the withdrawal of all civilian personnel and troops to the embarkation points, and covered a three day period.



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27 The ship's available were:

HMAS HOBART      Captain H.L. Howden OBE RAN
HMS CALEDON      Captain C.P. Clarke RN
HMS CERES           Captain E.G. Abbott RN HMS ;KAN DAHAR"                Commander W.G.A. Robson RN HMS KIMBERLEY            Lieut. Cdr F.S. M. Richardson RN HMS &CHAKDINA           Lieut. Cdr W. Hickey RNR HMS CHANTALA             Lieut. Cdr C.A..R. Gibbs RN HMS LAOMEDON            Commander C.A.R. Routh RN (Ret) HMS SHOREHAM            Commander G.P. Claridge RN
HMT AMBER           H.W.Clark Commissioned Bosun
HMHS KARAPARA
SS AKBAR SS TUNA

In addition HMS CARLISLE - Captain G.M.B. Langley OBE, RN with her valuable RDF equipment provided A/A protection from outside the Harbour.

28.  At 1315 I received SNO Red Sea's signal 0930Z/15 informing me that Middle East had ordered evacuation of British Somaliland. On receipt of this signal I appointed Lieutenant T.K. Morrison, RAN and Lieutenant C.V.S. Malleson, RN as my operational staff. These two Officers carried out the duties assigned to them in a most able and creditable fashion. On the many occasions that it was necessary for me to land or visit other ships during the period of evacuation I found that matters arising during my absence were dealt with in a competent manner.

29.  My day cabin turned into a combined room, with provision made for the Naval staff on one side, the GOC and military staff on the other, and the Air Liaison Officer at the end. The dining cabin became the ciphering office. The layout of arrangements generally enabled the work to run smoothly and expeditiously.

30.  During the afternoon I discussed matters with the Governor - His Excellency V. Glenday.

31.  At 1700, accompanied by Lieutenants Morrison and Malleson, I attended a conference with the Base Commandant Colonel Mills and his staff, and a representative from Army Forces Headquarters. At this conference the following points were decided:




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32. Following this conference I reported the situation to His Excellency The Governor and discussed with him the question of embarking in HMAS "HOBART" and remaining during the period of evacuation in order that the value of his advice on political matters might be available. His Excellency was much in favour of such a course but wished to confer with GOC first. The GOC informed me the following day that he felt it his duty to get His Majesty's representative to a place of safety, and so arrangements were made for him to sail for Aden in HMS "KINGSTON" the following afternoon.

33. The air raid on "HOBART" which took place at 1628 when bombs fell between "HOBART" and "SHOREHAM" was assumed to be but a "warmer" of what was to come.

34. HM Hospital Ship "VITA" had embarked all casualties from the native hospital and also the walking wounded who had arrived during that day from the fighting line, the total being one hundred and forty (See appendix "Medical Organisation"). I ordered "VITA" to shift berth to a position North East of Tamar Point Beacon after daylight the following morning in order to observe the Geneva Convention. On return to the ship an organisation was drawn up which, it was believed would be sufficiently flexible to deal with all eventualities as they arose. A berthing plan was arranged and the method of filling up and sailing the various transports provided for.

35.  It was arranged that Lieutenant-Commander Black RN (who had been appointed Sea Transport Officer Berbera just before evacuation had been decided upon), Lieutenant S.H. Crawford RANR (S) appointed from "HOBART" to be Sea Transport Officer and Beachmaster a few days earlier, and Lieutenant Jones RNR who had held the appointment of STO Berbera for several weeks past, and Sub-Lieutenant Wrench RNVR (Uganda) of "HOBART" should be stationed at the piers and embarkation points to carry out the duties of Beachmaster.

36. One of the problems exercising my mind was the thought of casualties to personnel by machine-gun attacks of low flying enemy fighters. Tugs "ZEILA" and "QUEEN" were accordingly armed with Lewis Guns.

37. To sum up the days results all the preliminary arrangements had been made both ashore and afloat and although it was realised that the situation might alter from hour to hour it was considered the arrangements made were sufficiently fluid to be able to deal with a rapidly changing situation.

38. At 0220 16th August I dispatched the following signal addressed SNORS (R) C. in CEI from "HOBART": "Zero hour for evacuation is 0800Z tomorrow Friday. Have suggested Governor embark in "HOBART" and remain until evacuation is completed to act as political adviser. He concurs and is conferring with GOC. Have had a conference with Military this afternoon. I am satisfied with the naval preparations made and am hopeful they will work satisfactorily. Can information be given of air assistance that may be expected? TOO  2320Z/ 5th August".
NOTE: The following Berths had been arranged at Berbera: A. 154degrees Tamar Point Beacon 5.1cables, B. C. and D 069 degrees 2.5, 5 and 7.5 cables respectively from A.

39. At 0530 "HOBART" weighed and shifted to Berth C. "CARLISLE" was sighted approaching from the Northward. Other berths were allocated as follows:
A. "AKBAR"
B. "LAOMEDON"
D. "CHAKADINA".
"KIMBERLY" and "SHOREHAM" were keeping A/S patrol at approaches to harbour, and "CARLISLE" anti-aircraft defence under outside.


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40. At 0530 while "HOBART" was shifting berth, two enemy aircraft attacked with bombs, which fell at the back of Berbera. They were engaged without apparent success by "CARLISLE", "SHOREHAM" and "HOBART" and shore batteries, and although bursts appeared very close indeed aircraft finally disappeared over the mountains to the South West. It was later reported and subsequently confirmed that one of these aircraft was down in the desert.

41. At 0730 "AMBER" entered harbour, and anchoring between "CHAKINDA" and Customs Pier unfortunately ran aground. It had been necessary to bring "AMBER" into harbour in order to coal tug "ZEILA" which was urgently in need of coal for the forthcoming operation. "AMBER" had been directed by signa1 to have coal in bags ready for transfer on arrival. Wind was force 6 from the SW and on the falling tide the efforts of "CHAKDINA" and "ZEILA" to refloat her were unsuccessful.

42. The danger of "ZEILA" herself running aground and thereby disrupting the embarking organisation was so real that I gave the orders for "ZEILA" to abandon attempts to tow "AMBER" clear. It was our first real setback and if the refloating attempts were to prove unsuccessful, the loss of the "AMBER" would prove a minor triumph for the Italians.

43. By 0930 there were hundreds waiting at Customs Pier, the majority appeared to be Abyssinian fighting men and their families who had been given asylum in British Somaliland following the Italian war against Abyssinia in 1935-36; also the families of Somali workers in Aden. Lieutenant Jones, one of the Beachmasters, experienced some difficulty in handling these crowds who feared to be left behind and who had divined our evacuation plans despite attempts to preserve civil and military secrecy.

At 1030 "HOBART'S" security platoons were landed and dispersed as follows: One platoon in town, half a platoon at Customs Pier, a section at Shaab Pier and the final section touring in a fifteen-hundredweight truck. No riots took place other than a disturbance that occurred in the NAFFI building where a number of native soldiers had broken in and were looting and drinking the wines and spirits. The security Patrol was not required for the remaining days of the evacuation.

44. The sea during the forenoon proved too much to allow the working of boats but walking and stretcher cases were transferred by pinnace to "ZEILA" and "QUEEN" and were subsequently taken.

45. At mid-day I went ashore with Lieutenant Malleson and attended a conference presided over by the GOC Somali Force, Major General A.R. Godwin-Austen who had just arrived from Advance Headquarters. Our previous arrangements were confirmed and the decision arrived at to do everything possible to save the 3 AA guns, four Bren carriers and Bofors Anti-tank guns. It was also decided that the army would be responsible for the demolition of the W/T masts, lighting and ice plant.

46. This conference was prolonged and much valuable time lost due to three air raid warnings, one of which developed into an attack at 1325. Three bombs were dropped near HMS "SHOREHAM" and three in the vicinity of the shore AA Battery injuring one man with splinters; and another at 1410 when bombs fell harmlessly near the "ZEILA" Road and on the landing ground.

47. Commander M.L. Vernon, RN Sea Transport Officer, Aden, arrived in "CHANTALA" at 1130. It was arranged that he would be in general charge of the embarkation points and generally supervise the work of the Beachmasters. This duty he performed with marked ability. I consider his display of initiative and driving force greatly assisted in expediting the embarkation.

48. At 1245 embarkation of "CHAKDINA" began and by 1427, 600 troops had already embarked despite the delays caused by two air raids. The ready cooperation of "CHAKDINA" was a feature that materially assisted the speed with which the evacuation was completed.

49. In the meantime Government ciphers; chests, records and specie had been embarked in "HOBART."

50. The GOC decided that the person of the Governor as King's representative should not be risked longer than necessary and so His Excellency and four gentlemen of his Staff were embarked in "KIMBERLEY" at 1630 and sailed for Aden at 1700.

51. At 1630 "AMBER" was refloated by her own means and sailed for Aden and took no further part in the operations.

52. By 1725 all the Civil population had been embarked but "CHAKDINA" continued loading Abyssinians and by 1845 had loaded 1,100 of all denominations. "CHAKDINA" was then sailed for Aden and "CHANTALA" which had arrived at 1224 anchored in Berth "D", the inner berth, in her place. NOIC Aden was asked to arrange for a quick turn around of "CHAKDINA" on her arrival at Aden and sail her again for Berbera.

53. In the evacuation plan it had been intended that the evacuation of troops should not commence until the following day or night but due to the grave and disquieting news from the front it was decided to embark all those in Berbera who could be spared, and any others as they arrived. Some two hundred and fifty men of King's African Rifles and Punjabis were sent to "LAOMEDON" and some few to "AKBAR".

54. At 1719 "KAN DAHAR" was sighted to the Northward and ordered to anchor in No.1 A/S berth keeping steam at immediate notice.

55. During the night a few walking wounded were embarked in "LAOMEDON" and some more serious cases sent to HS "VITA." The Arab labour party cleaned up "LAOMEDON" in preparation for filling her next day and two A/A guns were embarked on a lighter but the tide was not suitable to send them off.

56. As "VITA" had already taken off one hundred and forty seriously wounded and as large numbers of wounded might be expected the next day a signal was sent to SNORS requesting that HS "KARAPARA" be sailed to arrive Berbera not later than 1700 on the 17th August.

57.  At 2247 I despatched the following signal addressed C. in CEI and SNORS: "Program of evacuation completely up to date. "CHAKDINA" has sailed with 1,100 evacuees including two to three hundred Abyssinian women and children. Confirmed one of today's enemy bombers down in desert south of Berbera. Am embarking ammunition and other valuable stores through the night. All wounded have been embarked but more are continuing to arrive". TOO 1947Z/16.


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Saturday 17th August:

58. At 0343 "HOBART" sighted a flashing light in the direction of Shell Gap. This light continued to spell "Rosy" repeatedly. "HOBART" challenged with "Who are you" and received the reply "I am Aska detachment". The Military were informed accordingly.

59.  By 0500 the embarkation of all those who could be spared had been completed and weather conditions did not permit further work until 1030.

60.  "AKBAR" and "TUNA" weighed at dawn and proceeded to sea, maintaining V/S touch and anchoring again towards evening in order to reduce the risk of damage by air attack.

61.  HMS "CERES" which had been patrolling between Shell Gap and Sabawanak reported as follows:    
"0715. One Blenheim aircraft number 4834 force landed in the sea close to the ship. "CERES" went alongside but aircraft sank before it could be salvaged. The crew of three were rescued and also a certain amount of gear including the Vickers gun, bombsight, W/T set and signal and publications. On a report by the crew of the aircraft that their main petrol pipe had been severed by anti-aircraft fire from the scrub near Biyo Fogo, "CERES" spent the forenoon attempting to locate this emplacement and fired a small amount of 6" and pompom at likely spots. It is not known if any effective damage was done. In the afternoon, proceeded to Shell Gap and then patrolled to westward arriving off Bulhar at sunset. No enemy were seen between Shell Gap and Bulhar but in the latter village possible enemy activity was observed and four rounds of 6" were fired. During the night a close patrol was maintained off Shell Gap and a searchlight was switched on occasionally".

62.  At 1020 fifty men of the Arab labour corps were landed from "LAOMEDON" and set to work filling sand bags to make additional embarkation facilities at Spit Pier and for providing protection near the piers against fighter and bombing attacks. I was apprehensive concerning the possibility of machine gun attacks on personnel assembled at the embarkation points by enemy fighters as retaliation fire by ships close range weapons would endanger our own personnel. I consider that here the enemy missed his greatest opportunity to inflict casualties and disorganise our evacuation plans.

63.  "CARLISLE" was due to sail from Berbera on the evening of the 17th August to join convoy BN 3. I considered this ship with her modern RDF (Radar) enabling her to detect at great distances the approach of aircraft a most valuable adjunct during the period of the evacuation. I therefore despatched the following signal on the forenoon of 17th August, addressed SNORS (R) "CARLISLE" from SNO Berbera: "It is probable that our intention to evacuate will become known to the enemy today Saturday and it must therefore be expected that they will intensify their air attacks. The value of having "CARLISLE" here cannot be over-emphasised and I strongly recommend she remain until evacuation is accomplished night 18/19 August if such a course is feasible. To conduct the evacuation efficiently "HOBART" must remain in harbour and therefore firing arcs are restricted. TOO 0805Z 17th August". This signal was subsequently approved and "CARLISLE" remained.

64.  At 1025 "CARLISLE" reported aircraft to the westward and three minutes later confirmed they were remaining in Sector F about twenty miles away.

65.  During the forenoon "KANDAHAR" embarked a number of bulks of timber and a bale of sandbags for improvising a boat pier on the seacoast Eastward of Tamar Point Beacon should circumstances necessitate establishing an embarking point there.

66.   At 1053 the STO reported that 500 Abyssinian fighting men were expected from up country early pm and it was decided to load these in the "LAOMEDON", which had already some four hundred and eighty-five mostly natives on board, and to further their load "LAOMEDON" with the first regular troops to arrive from up another ship. Small bodies of troops from the front line, Base Staff and Base Hospital Staff were transferred to "LAOMEDON" and "VITA" during the afternoon.

67.  I learned at GHQ during the course of the afternoon that the enemy was inflicting heavy losses on our military forces, that they were infiltrating our lines and threatened to isolate the Black Watch and cut off their retreat, and that a general retreat of our forces had been ordered.

68.  All ships were acquainted by signal with the situation as far as it was known and preparations were made to embark three thousand instead of the planned two thousand troops or in fact even greater numbers if circumstances forced them to fall back on Berbera. I resolved that boats would continue running irrespective of the state of the weather, for as long as good seamanship made such a course practicable.

69.  Field communication at this stage had almost completely broken down and we all felt the disquieting effect of not knowing what was taking place at the Front.


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70.  The weather during the night of 17th August while being quite suitable for running boats was not suitable for sending off the wounded to "VITA". The wounded were therefore taken on-board "HOBART". The starboard shelter deck of "HOBART" was transformed into a Sickbay.

71.  At 2028 17th August, I despatched the following signal to SNORS (R) C. in CEI from SNO Berbera: "Military situation at the front has become critical. General retreat has been ordered and it is intended to embark troops throughout the night irrespective of weather. General staff embark in "HOBART" at 1900Z front line communications have practically broken down. Feared Black Watch may have suffered severely. All ciphers, special ammunition and two 3.7HA guns embarked. Improbable other material can be got away. Naval situation well in hand. TOO 1728z 17th August".

72.  From about sunset onwards a continuous stream of lorries driven at breakneck speed could be seen travelling down the La Ferug - Berbera Road, and intensive embarkation from Shaab and Spit Piers began at approximately 2030.

The welcome addition to "HOBART" boats of the Admiral's barge brought over in "LAOMEDON" and "LUCIA'S" two roomy motor cutters that "CHAKDINA" had brought over proved most valuable. In addition "CARLISLE", "KANDAHAR" and "SHOREHAM" were all called upon to provide every available powerboat.

74.  The seamanship, the courage, the resource and the common sense displayed by the coxswains and crews of the tugs and boats that continued to run during the blowing of the Kharif is deserving of the very highest praise. To them a great part of the success of the evacuation of British Somaliland belongs. Had they not displayed courage the boats could not have continued to run in the weather prevailing. Had they possessed courage yet lacked knowledge of seamanship their boats may have foundered. As it was the operation was completed without the loss of one boat. Several shipped heavy seas and most suffered damage to superstructure and gunwales etc. and one of "LUCIA'S" motor cutters nearly foundered - it was at first reported to me that she had - but by good seamanship was placed alongside "CHAKDINA" and hoisted in, her crew and load of soldiers being rescued by "KANDAHAR'S" motor cutter.
On this matter Sub-Lieutenant The Marquis of Milford Haven, RN of HMS "KANDAHAR" has submitted that "Earnest Gilbert Ham, Leading Seaman D/JX 130688 should be awarded for his service during the Army evacuation from Berbera on the night of 17/18th August for prompt action and good seamanship when, as coxswain of the motor cutter, he rescued soldiers and the crew of another motor cutter which had been swamped in Berbera Harbour in a short steep sea with force 6 wind blowing".

75.  During the whole of the operation commencing on the night of Thursday 15th August "HOBART'S" two motorboats, pinnace and two cutters continued to run. The Admiral's barge, two motor cutters from HMS "LUCIA", another motor cutter form Aden and boats from "CARLISLE" "KANDAHAR" and "SHOREHAM", although not running for the full period of the operation gave invaluable service.

76.  The tug "QUEEN" manned from "HOBART" gave good service until 0700 on 18th August when she was scuttled. The tug "ZEILA" with a "HOBART" crew in addition to the Somali crew was most ably handled by Chief Petty Officer W. Grigor official number 2325, in most trying circumstances, and gave invaluable service throughout the whole operation. I consider CPO Grigor's most able service deserving of special recognition.

77.  At 2200 the GOC and his staff embarked in "HOBART" and our already over-worked communication branch were keyed to even greater efforts. No praise is too high for the splendid way in which they cleared, received and issued an almost continuous stream of signals without lagging, and with a complete absence of errors.

78.  The number of signals received and despatched during the period amounted to 786 and 86 ciphers, making a total of 872. At least six copies of every signal was made and outgoing General Signals had to be made as many as five times to cover the ships in company. With the normal signal staff (probably Syd Clark too) depleted by three signalman ashore to provide communication at the embarkation points I consider this a magnificent achievement on the part of the communication Branch of HMAS "HOBART" and a reflection of the solid efficiency built up over a long period. I am of the opinion that especial credit is due to Chief Yeoman of Signals V.M. Griffiths official number 6909, who has been untiring in his efforts in training and organising the signal staff.

79.  A number of wounded were being received in "HOBART" and the starboard shelter deck was transformed into a Sickbay annex. Surgeon-Lieutenant-Commander H. Gillman Wells, RN and Surgeon-Lieutenant S.A. Sewell, RNNR assisted by Surgeon Lieutenant (D) Abrahams, RAN as anaesthetist were operating continuously from 2030 until 0200. Officers Stewards and others as they finished their duties in the Officer Messes went to the Sick Bay to offer their services in making up bandages, sterilising instruments etc, etc. The efficient organisation for dealing with the wounded onboard "HOBART" reflects great credit on Surgeon-Lieutenant-Commander H. Gillman Wells.

80.  Great credit is due also to Sick Berth Petty Officer M.P.A. Trilsson official number 17882. Not only did he display marked ability, high initiative and an untiring energy on this occasion, but the efficient running of the Sick Bay in the past is largely a reflection of this Sick Berth Petty Officer's superior ability.

81.  At 2215 the Somali Camel Corps W/T truck at Shell Gap was still in touch with "HOBART", but reported its batteries failing. There was no contact with the enemy on the coast at this stage. 82.  The RAAF photographer, Leading Air craftsman Howe, was sent ashore each day with instructions to photograph all objects of interest. The results are contained in the photographic Appendix


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Sunday 18th August.

83.  Up until 0230 a steady stream of troops had been arriving at the piers but about this time others ceased to arrive. It then became known that a major misfortune had occurred in the blowing up of a culvert by our own forces on the La Ferug-Berbera Road, down which out forces were retreating, before Black Watch which had been thrown in to stem the enemy's attack, had passed through.

84.  Commander Vernon informed me of the position by signal and with commendable expedition set off himself with Sub-Lieutenant The Maquis of Milford Haven, RN in two lorries and performed a most valuable service in bringing in detachments of the Black Watch who, being deprived of transport due to the culvert being blown up had commenced marching back to Berbera.

85.  I landed myself at this time and collected a number of Somali truck drivers and placed them under the charge of Signalman C. Martin, official number PA 1451, of "HOBART", who, before joining the Navy was a truck driver. This rating displayed qualities of initiative and resource in collecting the number of lorries required - which at this time was not a simple task for many lorries had been left without keys, others were damaged or left with flat batteries. He collected his convoy of trucks and so greatly assisted in the evacuation of detachments of the King's African Rifles. The native drivers I compensated by giving them a passage to Aden except to one who wished to remain in Somaliland to whom I presented a 1940 car that had run only fifty-one miles.

86.  At 0221 I despatched the following signal to SNORES (R) C in CEI from SNO Berbera: "Owing to a bridge having been demolished before our forces had passed through, speed of evacuation is very much retarded. Position too obscure at this stage to say when evacuation will be completed. Intend sailing "CHANTALA" and "AKBAR" before daylight. Each will have approximately 1,200. TOO 2321Z 17th August".

87.  A disturbing feature of the events of night 17-18th August was the reporting of a floating mine by HMS "CHAKDINA" drifting down between "HOBART" and "AKBAR". "CHAKDINA" had passed the mine so close I subsequently learned that she could not blow it up without damaging herself. I sent a boat out with the Torpedo Lieutenant to try to locate it, but although it was moonlight the mine could not be seen.

88.  I was left with the uncomfortable feeling, therefore, that apart from the possibility of it drifting on to "HOBART" or "AKBAR", which by that time had nearly 1,000 troops onboard, one of the boats laden with troops might conceivably strike it. However, to have stopped the boats running might, had the Italians attacked Berbera during embarkation operations, spelt an even greater disaster. I decided to keep the boats running and consider it as one of the risks that had to be accepted.

89.  HMS "CHERES" which was patrolling the coast west of Berbera with the object of:



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90.  After consultation with the GOC it was decided to land an officer as Forward Observation Officer with a signalman telegraphist and portable W/T set from "HOBART". Lieutenant T.M. Synnot, RAN was selected for this duty and landed at 0530. He stationed himself on the Government House Tower from which he commanded a clear view of the surrounding country, and with a team of two telegraphists (probably Syd Clark), two signalman, two able seaman and two stokers he did excellent work in sending out cars and trucks to bring in stragglers - numbers of whom were so recovered.

91.  At 0550 HMS "CHAKDINA" carrying 1294 and HT "AKBAR" carrying 2021 troops and two valuable 3.7inch HA guns sailed for Aden. HMS "CHAKDINA" moved into the inner "D" berth vacated by "CHANTALA".

92.  At 0620 "HOBART'S" aircraft was catapulted for a reconnaissance of all passes to the Berbera plain. It had only been possible to repair two of the six broken ribs that the Walrus had suffered from the blast of our HA guns when in action against aircraft on 16th August. The risk in flying the aircraft in its damaged state I considered acceptable in the view of the importance of reconnaissance at this stage. In spite of this defect there was no hesitation on the part of the Observer Officer - Lieutenant Malleson RN, the pilot Flight Lieutenant T.H. Davies, RAAF or the crew to operate the aircraft, but on the contrary a most eager spirit to do so.

93.  Shell Gap (not marked on the chart or map is a defile twenty miles by road West of Berbera near Heiro) was closely inspected, but there was no sign of the enemy, neither could be seen at Caran Pass or on the La Ferug Road. While inspecting this road three low flying monoplanes were sighted to the south; but these proved to be our Blenheims. It was these aircraft that half an hour later unfortunately bombed units of Somali Camel Corps at Shell Gap, killing some natives. The aircraft continued to reconnoitre the perimeter of the plain but there were no signs of the enemy.

94.  The aircraft landed at 0730 and was hoisted in, with a wind force 6-7 and a steep sea. I consider this a commendable landing reflecting credit on the pilot Flight Lieutenant Davies, RAAF.

95.  We had been most fortunate in the weather. Contrary to what it was reasonable to expect the wind during the night never blew force 3. But the daylight it freshened until at 0900 it blew force 5. At 0800 I received the following signal from Commander Vernon: "380 men left ashore forced to wait until 1400"; and at 0804 the following signal from Brigadier to GOC was shown to me: "Wind too strong to continue embarkation. About 300 troops still ashore".
I considered that the weather at this stage was such that boats, if well handled, could continue to run. Attacks by bomber or fighter craft on the personnel at the pier, or of a land attack by mechanised units (the Berbera covering force had been withdrawn at 0500) were an ever present consideration, and it was against the possibility, or more correctly the probability, of such attacks that risks in other directions had to be weighed. It is perhaps as well to mention that it had not been possible for the Army to dig the slit tranches near the pier for protection against air raids and therefore any accumulation of personnel would have been without protection of any kind. I therefore gave orders that embarkation was to continue but that boats were to be lightly loaded.

96. The following signal was despatched to STO from SNO Berbera. "Please make every endeavour to get a decked-in lighter alongside the side of the Pier now and load the three inch gun, remaining Bren carriers as soon as tide is suitable. With present weather conditions I consider it practicable to continue embarking troops into "CHAKDINA" provided boats are lightly loaded. TOO 0835C 18th Aug.".


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By this time I had become hopeful that it might be possible to embark the valuable two 3.7"HA guns and three Bren carriers, and arranged for their crews to be landed from "CHAKDINA" Two 3.7"HA guns had already been embarked. At 0800 HMS "LAOMEDON" carrying 1013 troops and having hoisted in the Admiral's barge weighed and proceeded to sea remaining in visual touch until "CHAKDINA" was ready.

97.  About this time I received a report that the tug "QUEEN" had been scuttled by order of the STO Commander Vernon. In the prevailing weather this tug had been unable to handle the lighters. "HOBART'S" motorboat had assisted with the lighter and secured it alongside Shaab Pier. The "QUEEN" had in the meantime steamed up to her buoy and secured to it. The coxswain landed and reported to Commander Vernon and received orders to scuttle her.

98.  On receiving these orders the crew steamed her to a position near Customs Pier and removed the condenser and bilge ejector valves. The effect was not very successful for with the rising tide she drifted nearer the shore.

99. I felt that such an act was an unnecessary sacrifice, for it had been my intention to have the "QUEEN" towed back to Aden. I therefore made my intention clear in this regard and issued definite instructions that no tug or lighter was to be scuttled without my direct orders. During the bombardment on the morning or the 19th August two rounds of 6" HE were fired at the "QUEEN". The effect of these rounds I had no opportunity to establish.


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100.  At 0835 HMHS "VITA" sailed independently for Aden with 156 wounded on board.

101.  At 0916 on the 18th "KANDAHAR" reported that our aircraft were bombing on the road nine miles west of Berbera and proposed bombarding. A signal was made to him to investigate further but not to bombard until certain beyond all doubt that his target was the enemy as units of the Camel Corps were expected. While this signal was in the process of being passed he was seen to open fire. "Cease firing" was passed immediately. Shortly afterwards he reported aircraft bombing tanks and it was approved for him to cooperate.
At 1100 "KANDAHAR" proceeded to escort two lorries along the Berbera road, which had been found by the RAF into Berbera.

102.  During the forenoon small groups of men could be seen marching their way along the beach from the west and boats on Lieutenant's lorries rescued those.

103.  At 1050 HMS "DERBY" arrived bringing with her six midshipmen from HMS "ROYAL SOVEREIGN". Two of these midshipmen M.P. Phillips and Mr. Nash were sent to the Tug "ZEILA" and the remainder sent ashore to assist the Beach Masters.

104.  By 1240 HMS "CHAKDINA" had embarked 628 evacuees of various types and hoisted in the "LUCIA's" cutters. She weighed and the convoy consisting of "LAOMEDON" and "CHAKDINA" escorted by "CENUS" and "KANDAHAR" joined up outside and proceeded to Aden. "CARLISLE" gave them an A/A escort until twenty miles clear of the coast and returned to her A/A patrol off Berbera

105.  HMS "DERBY" shifted berth to secure two lighters and sailed with them in tow for Aden, with tug "ZEILA" in company at 1700. The tow parted on several occasions during passage but all arrived safely twenty-four hours later.

106.  Throughout the afternoon "HOBART'S" demolition party had been operating ashore and had been active in setting fire to petrol and small arms ammunition dumps and destroying electrical machinery, motor transports etc., and later when embarkation was completed in firing the Spit and Shaab Piers.

107.  At 1607 enemy aircraft were sighted approaching "HOBART" from down sun and were at close range when seen. They were three S.79's and must have released their bombs simultaneously with our first guns and within a minute of the alarm. The bombs in the nature of 100lb were whistling ominously louder as they fell and it was no surprise to be straddled by a salvo of eight bombs, the nearest missing by 15yards. There were several near misses to personnel by flying splinters, but no one was injured and except for damage to the stern of the pinnace by a large splinter there was no material damage. Cease fire was ordered shortly after the bombers passed as a Glen Martin aircraft was diving down on the Italians from where he had been patrolling at height.

108.  At 1731 after eight wounded had been transferred from "HOBART", HM Hospital Ship "KARAPARA" was sailed independently for Aden.

109.  HMS "CALEDON" arrived at 1739.

110.  By the end of the day the valuable equipment consisting of Bren gun carriers, Bofors guns and two HA guns had all been successfully embarked, but there yet remained two 3.7HA guns which are heavy awkward affairs to handle without any form of lifting devices.

111.  Arrangements had been made for the guns crews The Singapore and Hong Kong RA under the A/A battery commander (Captain Darling) to be landed from the "TUNA" and a working party of thirty from "HOBART" under Lieutenant J.M. Ramsay RAN had been landed in an attempt to embark the guns during the next high tide. I landed towards sunset to find the disturbing sight of one of these guns having sunk in the pier, which had carried away under its weight.

112. To give the pier sufficient strength to carry the gun it was necessary to lat its surface with timbers. All this re- ???? valuable item. That these guns, in face of such difficulties were eventually embarked with but no time to spare before the tide fell was a most satisfactory feature of the evacuation. When the "TUNA" sailed at 2215 with these guns and a number of evacuees and a lighter in tow, I made a signal to Captain Darling expressive of my gratitude.

113.  Notices addressed to all Government Servants in British Somaliland from the GOC were that evening placed on notice boards outside Government House and the Post Office. The notice read as follows:"For Military reasons I have been compelled to withdraw the British Military Forces from Somaliland. I realise that in doing so many loyal Government servants are left without employment, some without payment for services rendered and some without payment of pensions or gratuities due to them. In the name of the Government therefore, I declare that the British Government will not fail in its obligations to its servants. I shall approach my Government with a view to ensuring that payment due shall either be made in the near future by arrangement with the Italian Authorities, or later by some intermediary appointed by the Government. The British Government will not neglect its duties towards its loyal servants for whose services I thank you in its name.

           "(Signed)  A.R. Godwin-Austen, MAJOR GENERAL.


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114.  At 1832 the following signal was despatched to C-in-C EI, SNORS (R) "CARLISLE" from SNO Berbera: "Evacuation complete except for uncertain number, possibly 50, who have not yet reached Berbera. Total number embarked approximately 6,000. Two anti-aircraft guns, three Bren gun carriers and two Bofors still ashore. An attempt is being made to embark these tonight, Sunday. "HOBART'S" demolition parties are operating ashore Tug "ZEILA" and "DERBY" with two lighters in tow has sailed for Aden. Expect to sail "TUNA" with two lighters tonight Sunday. Intend "HOBART" to sail AM tomorrow Monday after bombardment of Berbera. It is expected that all stragglers will have embarked by then. TOO 1532Z 18".

115.  The fires that had been started by the demolition parties during the afternoon continued to burn furiously until late into the night. The rattle of small arms ammunition made by the burning dumps could be heard and large volumes of flame would shoot up from time to time accompanied by a hollow explosion as some container of flammable material ignited.

116.  It was flat calm with a full rising moon, and the light from the moon and from those raging fires was reflected in still harbour waters - a scene of tragic beauty and terrible destruction - a sight into the meaning of war.

117.  At 0300 the salvage ship "PROTECTOR" arrived and tow remaining lighters were towed off to her with "HOBART'S" motorboat. She sailed with both lighters in tow at 0450 and arrived without mishap at Aden the following day.

118.  During the course of the night one or two stragglers were seen along the beach. Boats were sent in on each occasion to rescue them. One man from the Black Watch was found naked. In his distracted state he was about to attempt to swim off to the ship - an impossible task in his exhausted state.

119.  At daylight a boat was sent in and a final search made in the vicinity of the landing places for any remaining stragglers before commencing the bombardment of Berbera. Three native hospital orderlies were recovered.

120.  Later, during the course of the bombardment, other stragglers were observed on the beach beyond the lighthouse. By this time the Kharif was blowing and boat work difficult. Lieutenant Synnot RAN was sent in the motorboat to effect their rescue. He anchored the boat as near the beach as was reasonable in the wind and sea prevailing. He and Able Seaman V.E. Lewis RANR the bowman of the motorboat, both strong swimmers swam ashore with bottles of water. They found three men of the King's African Rifles suffering from severe exhaustion. They revived them with water and removed their boots and swam back through the surf with them to the boat.  A most creditable performance.

121.  At 0745 commenced bombarding Berbera. Government House was opened fire on first and all important bathythermographs the two hospitalise storehouses and the large bungalows of the Administration came under fire. The storehouse near the Customs Pier where great quantities of food and other stores remained received several salvoes and large fires were started.

122.  HMS "CALEDON" cruised along the coast to the West of Berbera as far as Gerih in search of any remaining stragglers, but none were seen. She returned then to Aden.

123.  HMS "HOBART" weighed at 0845 and proceeded to Aden at twenty-five knots, arriving at 1500. The GOC and his staff disembarked at 1600.


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124.  During the whole period of this operation, and in fact during the whole period preceding it when British Somaliland was being reinforced, I had that confident feeling that whatever task might be asked or required, whatever duties might be assigned or whatever difficulties might arise, whether it required skill or ability, endurance, initiative or courage, the officers and ship's company of HMA Ship under my command could be relied upon to give a most creditable account of themselves. It was gratifying to find my confidence was not misplaced.

125.  I cannot better express my opinion of the most admirable and able manner in which officers and men conducted themselves throughout every phase of the operation, than to state what I have already stated to the assembled ship's company that I am very proud of them.

126.  I wish also to report of the most willing and able service given by the other ships present. HM Ships, Hired Transports, Hospital ships and ships of the mercantile marine all were eager to assist in any way. 

127.  My recommendations for Decorations and Awards are contained in an Appendix to this report.

        I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant, (Signature) H.L.         Howden – Captain


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GUNNERY APPENDIX

Thu 15 Aug. 1625:  Opened fire on two Italian Aircraft that approached from the direction of the sun. Aircraft dropped stick of six bombs on a line parallel to the ship - nearest bomb ninety yards.

Friday 16 Aug. 0555 Opened fire on two Italian Aircraft (Savoia SI). Fired fifty-one rounds four-inch HE. Aircraft,    which were also engaged by "CARLISLE," "SHOREHAM" and the shore battery, jettisoned six bombs in the desert SE of the town.

1100:  One reduced platoon of seamen and one reduced platoon of Stokers, armed with rifles, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Johns, RN and lieutenant (E) Williams RAN were landed to ensure the security of the Shaab Pier and to prevent looting, the native police force having been disbanded. Headquarters were established at the Berbera Club and sections posted at the Customs Pier to guard ammunition dump and supervise embarkation of civilian evacuees, at the Shaab Pier and at the NAAFI Canteen. During the forenoon twin Lewis Guns were mounted on the tugs "QUEEN" and "ZEILA" for use against low flying aircraft. All boat crews were provided with steel helmets, pistols and equipment.

1318:  Two Italian Aircraft sighted to NW.
1320:  Opened fire 5/4 fired 37rounds four-inch HE.
1320:  Three bombs dropped close to "SHOREHAM" and three near A/A battery ashore. Aircraft passed over the town and retired to the Southward, pursued by one fighter aircraft (Glen Martin).
1400:  Opened fire on two Italian aircraft flying very high (approx. 20,000feet). Fired 38 rounds four inch HE. Twelve bombs dropped on shore on a line from the Lighthouse to the Eastern edge of the Aerodrome.

2130: Security platoons re-embarked.


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Sat 17 Aug. There were five air raid alarms during the day but no raids eventuated. During the whole afternoon our fighter patrol could be heard overhead but it was not once sighted.

0530: Lieutenant T.M. Synnot RAN landed with portable W/T set to act as liaison officer at Base Headquarters and forward observation officer to harass the enemy advance by bombardment if required. Established position on roof of Government House.

1610:  Opened fire on three Italian aircraft that approached from the direction of the sun. Fired 38 rounds four-inch HE. Eight bombs dropped which straddled the ship athwart ships. Nearest bomb fifteen yards from starboard side of the forecastle. Numerous splinters picked up on the upper deck and bridges were all of a very thin metal indicating that light case anti-personnel bombs were used.

1830:  Two Lewis guns sections of seamen and stokers landed. Took up positions at landward and of SHAAB Pier to cover working parties on the pier.

2130:  Lieutenant Synnot and party and Lewis Gun sections re-embarked.


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Mon 19 Aug. 0500: Hands closed up at Action Stations to be ready to open fire with six inch armament in the event of enemy units being sighted on the plain at dawn.

0745: Commenced six-inch bombardment of important buildings. Direct observation was employed. In most cases two gun salvos were fired, but two or three four-gun salvos were also fired. Ranges varied between 1500yards (fixed sight) and about 2,000 yards, and nearly all rounds obtained direct hits. All bursts observed gave off black smoke indicating complete detonation. Ammunition expended were 66 rounds six inch HE. The following buildings were destroyed:
Government House, Police Barracks, Police Lines, Store house to the South East of the Customs Pier, Government Offices and a number of the more important bungalows and houses.

Note: The three-pounder Hotchkiss QF gun (Regd. no. 257), which was landed on 9 Aug. and mounted in front line in the TUG ARGON sector, was captured by the enemy. The gun's crew has been reported missing, believed killed (later liberated & treated well). The full outfit of three-pounder ammunition, i.e. 32 rounds steel shell and 32 rounds HE were landed with it

DEMOLITION APPENDIX

The following material was destroyed by parties from HMAS "HOBART"two patrol dumps one of which was reported to contain 30,000 gallons of petrol. Post Office spare gear store containing: one spare A.C./D.C. generator, one W/T transmitter of obsolete design, three receiving sets of obsolete design, spare W/T valves, numerous spare electrical gear, one unseaworthy steel lighter. Also one wooden pontoon lighter, large numbers of motor transports & isolated small arms dumps. The Shaab Pier was fired but failed to burn to any appreciable extent.
It had originally been arranged that "HOBART" would demolition the two lattice W/T masts but at a conference on 17 Aug. the RE’s were chosen for this work. However this was never accomplished and it is regretted that the task ever passed out of our hands.

MINES  AND SUBMARINES  APPENDIX




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